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ABSTRACT 
Local law enforcement agencies play a significant role in domestic counter-
terrorism and homeland security. The intelligence function of law enforcement agencies 
enhances their ability to detect criminal activity related to terror groups, as well as the 
ability to prevent, or respond to a terrorist attack. 
This research project identifies policies and procedures that could be implemented 
by local law enforcement agencies to enhance cooperation and collaboration with other 
public sector agencies, private sector security providers, and the general public. The 
policies and procedures are based on intelligence-led policing, and public-private 
partnerships and will generate the ability to increase the flow of information disseminated 
from, and collected by law enforcement intelligence entities. The resulting intelligence 
developed by law enforcement intelligence can be pushed up to the state and national 
level to improve the nation’s ability to detect potential terrorist activity, protect citizens, 
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
In the months following the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, members of the 
law enforcement community recognized the need for comprehensive intelligence in order 
to comply with the objectives outlined in the National Strategy for Homeland Security.1 
Law enforcement executives throughout the country have responded to meet this need by 
increasing manpower and equipment resources in their criminal intelligence units.  In 
spite of this new commitment to intelligence, most agencies have yet to fully develop 
adequate policies and procedures to make the intelligence more actionable and relevant to 
the goal of enhancing homeland security. In order for local law enforcement agencies to 
contribute to a national counter-terror intelligence network, there is a need to determine 
the most effective methods for information gathering and analysis, and for the 
dissemination of intelligence that could be used to detect and disrupt terrorist activity 
being conducted within the continental United States.  
It has become widely accepted that law enforcement agencies need to participate 
in a collaborative counter-terrorism network. The 9/11 Commission report stressed the 
need for a unity of effort in sharing information, and the importance of intelligence 
analysis that could draw upon all relevant sources of information.2 Prior to 2001, 
intelligence units in local law enforcement agencies were focused on collecting 
information related to domestic criminal activity, such as organized crime and illegal 
narcotics sales. Unfortunately, most agencies simply increased their pre-9/11 activities, 
and failed to recognize the need to develop a new intelligence strategy. In spite of the 
obvious need to share information, many agencies have also failed to institute policies or 
adopt procedures that encourage the prompt dissemination of intelligence to law 
enforcement and non-law enforcement government agencies, as well as to private 
security agencies that protect vital infrastructure.   
                                                 
1 The National Strategy for Homeland Security identified three strategic objectives: preventing 
terrorist attacks within the United States; reducing America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimizing the 
damage and recovery from attacks that do occur. 
2 Thomas H Kean, Lee H Hamilton, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (New York: W.W. Norton, 2004), 417. 
2 
There is also a need for agencies to recognize that the information collection 
process must involve all sworn members, and not be limited to only those investigators 
assigned to counter-terrorism cases. Modern terror groups are employing criminal 
enterprises such as larceny, drug trafficking, forgery and identity theft in order to further 
their goals, or finance their missions. Uniformed patrol officers are usually the first to 
become aware of suspicious activity related to these crimes, unfortunately the 
information does not often reach the local intelligence unit. By integrating intelligence-
led policing policies, departments can increase the amount of information that is 
collected, and actually produce terrorism intelligence instead of merely utilizing 
intelligence passed down from State and Federal sources.  
In order to develop a robust domestic intelligence network that will be truly useful 
in providing protection from terror activity within our borders, agencies must adopt 
strategies and standards of intelligence and information management. The intelligence 
management model should adopt a structure for the integration of agency-wide 
intelligence, file protocols, as well as security clearances and training requirements for 
analysts. 
A robust domestic law enforcement intelligence network is essential for providing 
protection from terror activity within our borders. As the network grows with the addition 
of more participating agencies, the adoption of strategies for improving intelligence and 
information management will help to form a more unified system. This unity will aid in 
the development of new methods and strategies that can be employed to detect, and / or 
deter terrorist activity, protect potential terror targets, and to hasten recovery efforts if an 
attack should occur. Once these counter terrorism strategies are identified, agencies will 
be able to focus their assets to develop actionable intelligence in support of the strategies.  
 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This research project will attempt to identify the policies and procedures that 
should be implemented in order to fulfill the current and future intelligence needs of local 
police agencies, in order to enhance the nation’s ability to detect potential terrorist 
activity, protect citizens, and safeguard critical infrastructure.  
  
3 
C. SPECIFIC RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
The objective of my research is twofold; I will identify best-practices that are 
currently in use by State, and local intelligence units, and I will seek to identify cost-
effective strategies for the implementation of a new intelligence paradigm in order to 
provide guidance to law enforcement executives. The new paradigm will identify 
recommendations for improving information collection, training standards for 
intelligence analysts, strategies for inter-agency cooperation, as well as proper formats 
for intelligence dissemination. This research will focus on developing a strategy to 
incorporate the intelligence function throughout the various disciplines that are inherent 
in modern law enforcement agencies, and to identify readily available sources of 
information that have gone untapped by law enforcement intelligence analysts.   
 
D. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
According to a recent study conducted in cooperation with the International 
Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) by the Justice Department’s Community Oriented 
Policing Services (COPS) during the year 2000 there were 17,784 state an d local law 
enforcement agencies in the United States, employing 708,000 full-time sworn officers. 
By contrast, there were only 88,500 federal law enforcement officers.3 Employing the 
vast resource of State and local agencies would surely enhance the effort to reduce the 
threat and impact of terrorism in the United States.  The development and adoption of 
standards in the field of intelligence will create a broad-based network response to 
terrorism by combining the resources of all law enforcement agencies. 
 
E. REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE 
The focus of this research is to identify a viable structure for the further 
integration of the intelligence function into current law enforcement practices and 
methods. In my research to date, I have found that leading experts have recognized the 
need to improve the intelligence function at the local level and have proposed many ideas 
that might help to improve organizational structure as well as the quality of the 
deliverable intelligence product.  
                                                 
3 IACP, COPS.  Private Security/Public Policing Partnerships (Washington D.C. 2004), 1 
http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/mime/open.pdf?Item=1355. Last accessed 12/08/05. 
4 
In his Guide for State, Local, and Tribal Law Enforcement Agencies, Dr. David 
L. Carter4 advocates the need for structure and standardization regardless of the size of 
the Agency or the availability of manpower. He stated, “common standards, policies, and 
practices will help expedite intelligence sharing while at the same time protect the 
privacy of citizens and preserving hard-won community policing relationships.” These 
community policing relationships will be useful in the development of local criminal 
intelligence because the COP officers have “immediate and unfettered access to local, 
neighborhood information as it develops.” Carter recognizes that the relationships that 
have been developed over the past decades should not be abandoned, but should be a 
cornerstone of what he describes as a shift into “intelligence-led policing”(ILP).5 
A 2005 study sponsored by the Police Executive Research Forum reinforces the 
arguments made by Carter. The study, Protecting the Community from Terrorism, 
volume 4, advocates the need for an organization-wide commitment to change in order to 
fully incorporate ILP. The PERF study calls for the development of “cadres of 
intelligence and analytic experts who are professionally trained and educated” in order to 
develop a collaborative national network.6  An analyst's training should include a national 
and local perspective to avoid “passivity” in which analyst simply respond to requests for 
information, without performing any substantive analysis.    
To address the need for structure, an Intelligence Working Group sponsored by 
the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) produced a National Criminal 
Intelligence Sharing Plan outlining recommendations for better methods of sharing 
critical data among all law enforcement agencies.7  
In addition to calling for unity of effort in intelligence sharing among law 
enforcement agencies, the 9/11 Commission also spoke about the over-classification of 
                                                 
4 David L. Carter, Guide for State, Local, and Tribal Law Enforcement Agencies (East Lansing: 
Michigan State University, 2004), 2-4. http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/Default.asp?Item=1404. Last accessed 
10/15/05. 
5 Carter, Guide, 40. 
6 Loyka et al., Protecting the Community from Terrorism, volume 4 (Washington D.C. Police 
Executive Research Forum, 2005) 29  http://policeforum.mn-
8.net/default.asp?link=%2Fdocs%2Fdocapp%2Easpx%3F%5Fcommand%3Ddetail%26%5Fappid%3D5%
26id%3D41645%26%5FclientInfo%3D%253cclientInfo%253e%253cfid%253e%2D1%253c%252ffid%25
3e%253c%252fclientInfo%253. Last accessed 09/21/05. 
7 Department of Homeland Security, National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan. 
5 
information and how there is no punishment for failing to share information. They 
recognize the importance of sensitive material, but stress the need to create a “trusted 
information network” which would operate on a “need to share” basis.8 The nation's most 
critical infrastructure locations are often controlled by private security agencies that do 
not have access to counter-terrorism intelligence. It is necessary for agencies to create 
information sharing networks, which will facilitate the transfer of information between 
law enforcement and the private sector. 
The IACP, COPS study on Private Security/Public Policing Partnerships claimed 
that there are 90,000 private security organizations employing roughly 2 million security 
Officers in the United States. The study suggested, however, that only five to ten percent 
of law enforcement chief executives participate in any collaborative partnerships with 
private security. The study recommends that leaders of the major law enforcement and 
private security organizations should endorse the implementation of sustainable public–
private partnerships in order to address terrorism, public disorder, and crime.9  In order to 
avoid the release of sensitive information, Dr Carter provides general rules for the release 
of information. He advocates that intelligence analysts prepare two versions of an 
intelligence product if it becomes necessary to release information outside of law 
enforcement, an unclassified public version, and a “Law Enforcement Sensitive” version. 
The Law Enforcement Sensitive version would provide more detailed information about 
suspects.  If there is a credible threat to a civilian target it may become necessary that 




Local law enforcement agencies play a significant role in counter-terrorism and 
homeland security. The intelligence function of these agencies enhances their ability to 
detect criminal activity related to terror groups, as well as the ability to prevent, or 
respond to a terrorist attack. Since many existing intelligence policies and procedures are 
                                                 
8 See note 2 above. 
9 IACP, COPS. 2004. Private Security/Public Policing Partnerships. 2 
http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/mime/open.pdf?Item=1355. Last accessed 12/08/05. 
10 Carter, Guide, 83. 
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inadequate for the homeland security mission, there is a need to provide guidance for 
improving the intelligence structure within law enforcement agencies in order to make 
the agency better able to fulfill its expected role in the homeland security effort. 
 
G. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
(a) Literature review of current information regarding the most useful policies to 
implement to integrate the intelligence function throughout a local law enforcement 
agency, identify training standards for analysts, and improve the quality of the 
intelligence end-product.    
(b) Case study will examine successful strategies that are currently producing 
verifiable successes. Identification of best practices could be used to guide local law 
enforcement decision makers to allocate their resources into areas that will provide the 
best chance of success in increasing preparedness, and in identifying criminal or 
suspicious activity that may be a precursor to a terrorist event.  
The cases that I will compare include, but are not limited to: 
• The New York Office of Homeland Security's Operation Safeguard as an 
example of Intelligence-Led Policing techniques used as the basis of an 
anti-terrorism program. 
• The Los Angeles Terrorism Early Warning Group as an example of how 
the resources of non-law enforcement public agencies can be integrated 
with those of law enforcement to enhance the intelligence network. 
• The Nassau County Police Department Security Police Information 
Network as a model for incorporating the resources of private security 
agencies into the law enforcement intelligence network. 
7 
II. THE LAW ENFORCEMENT INTELLIGENCE NETWORK 
The law enforcement intelligence network is essential to the responsibility of 
providing protection from terrorism in the United States. Not all law enforcement 
agencies will have the resources to develop a full intelligence function, but all can benefit 
from a better understanding the intelligence process, because the basic steps in the 
process take place either formally or informally in every law enforcement agency.  
Understanding the principles of the intelligence process, the common terminology, and 
the most effective methods for consuming the intelligence products that are disseminated 
by network participants will enhance an agencies ability to reduce crime and provide 
homeland security.  
The initial homeland security efforts in the United States have focused primarily 
on developing strategies, conducting training, and obtaining equipment that will be used 
in response to a successful terror attack. Since a great deal of attention was given to the 
heroism, leadership, response and recovery to the 9/11 terror attacks, many decision 
makers were focused on repeating those successes.  Federal, State and local law 
enforcement agencies have spent vast sums of money to purchase personal protective 
equipment, response vehicles, and search and rescue equipment, all of which could be 
used after a successful terror attack. The majority of anti-terrorism training and exercises 
have focused on response to Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, Explosive 
(CBRNE), and other mass casualty events. While these efforts have been worthwhile, 
expanding the focus to include counter-terrorism activities such as the detection of 
terrorists, and the prevention of attacks is the best way for police agencies to achieve the 
ultimate goal of protecting citizens from an attack.  
 
A. WHAT IS INTELLIGENCE? 
Attaining the most benefit from the intelligence products requires some 
understanding of terminology and processes. The term “intelligence” has different 
meanings depending on its use. For example “intelligence” is often used to describe the 
“The Intelligence Community”, the Federal and Military agencies involved in national 
security. It is also used to describe the process of collecting, exploiting, analyzing, and 
8 
disseminating data to support strategic plans. “Intelligence” is also used in referring to the 
unit within an agency that performs these functions. The most accurate meaning relative 
to this discussion is that intelligence is the product that is produced when trained analysts 
exploit, evaluate, and focus information so that it supports a strategic need of the agency. 
Law enforcement agencies have access to a vast amount of information from an endless 
list of sources. The information is not intelligence until it is recognized, analyzed, and put 
into a format that supports the needs of the agency.  
In this paper the term “intelligence” will be used to describe the finished product 
of the intelligence process. All other references will be noted as the “intelligence 
function,” the “Intelligence Unit,” or the “Intelligence Community.”   
 
B. THE INTELLIGENCE PROCESS 
The National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan11 released in 2003 by the Bureau 
of Justice Assistance recognizes six steps in the law enforcement intelligence Process. 
The diagram shows that the process is not linear with clear beginning and ending points. 
The process is circular in that the effectiveness of intelligence products are evaluated to 
see how effectively they met the agencies needs, then that evaluation is used as the basis 
for future planning decisions.  
                                                 




Figure 1.   The Intelligence Process 
 
1. Planning 
Law enforcement agencies in the United States have varied missions, and 
therefore they have different intelligence needs. Many police departments conduct patrol, 
response, and investigation functions, while other agencies such as some Highway 
Patrols focus solely on enforcing laws, and promoting safety for vehicular and pedestrian 
traffic. Agencies like the Federal Bureau of Investigation do not conduct any patrol 
functions because all their efforts go into investigating criminal cases. Each agency 
adopts the most logical anti-terrorism, or counter-terrorism strategies, and therefore must 
determine the way in which intelligence can assist their particular efforts.  
Just as specific intelligence requirements vary among agencies, requirements may 
also vary between units within an agency. A unit that investigates financial crimes may 
have different informational needs than a unit that investigates cybercrimes, or a unit that 
provides dignitary protection. Since most agencies have finite intelligence resources, a 







analysis. Decision makers need to be governed by the analysis of crime patterns and 
trends when setting agency priorities or allocating intelligence resources.12   
 
2. Collection  
Law Enforcement agencies continuously collect information through processes 
such as observations, victim and witness reports, physical and electronic surveillance, 
confidential informants, electronic databases and news media accounts. As technology 
continues to improve, agencies are integrating more sources into the collection process. 
The Internet provides access to an overwhelming amount of information about people, 
locations, and events. Additional collection benefits may be realized through recruitment 
of younger analysts who have grown up with the Internet and the resulting information 
explosion that has occurred over the past fifteen years. The new analysts will be much 
more computer savvy, and more creative in their search for information13. 
In addition to the electronic and traditional methods for collecting information, 
this paper advocates expanding the collection process by employing intelligence-led 
policing techniques, and by utilizing the resources of the Public and Private sector to 
create new sources for information collection.  
It is important to note that all decisions regarding the collection of information 
must be made with a careful regard for Federal, State, and local laws.   
 
3. Processing 
Processing is the function of separating relevant and factual data from the 
irrelevant and incorrect data, then cataloging the relevant data in a usable format.  
In light of the large number of information sources, vetting information for 
accuracy and reliability can become time consuming. Agencies that use software to 
identify relevant files must examine and often investigate the information contained in 
the file to determine its validity. A database search may identify a case record that 
                                                 
12 U.S. Department of Justice. Law Enforcement Analytic Standards (Washington D.C. 2004), 17 
http://it.ojp.gov/documents/law_enforcement_analytic_standards.pdf. Last accessed 05/10/05. 
13 Treverton, Gregory F., The Next Step in Reshaping Intelligence, RAND Corporation (Santa Monica 
2005), 21. 
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appears to have a relevance to terrorism, but the information should not be used as a basis 
for an intelligence report until the circumstances in the case record are verified through 
investigation. Police departments often create case reports based on witness accounts of 
suspicious activity. After investigation, many of these cases are closed because the 
seemingly suspicious activity is found to have a legitimate non-criminal purpose. 
 
4. Analysis 
Analysis is the process of assigning meaning to data. A law enforcement analyst 
reviews data and evaluates its value as it might relate to crime patterns, current 
investigations, or long-term strategic planning. The information is then converted to a 
format that can be used to support operational activities. 
The analyst should indicate the facts that are know, as well as those that are 
incomplete or missing. Law enforcement intelligence products provide hypotheses about 
criminal offenders, crime patterns and trends, or other potential threats to the jurisdiction.  
 
5. Dissemination 
Dissemination is the process of getting actionable intelligence to those who have 
the need and the right to use it. This process requires continuous management to find the 
balance between sharing valuable information and withholding intelligence that might 
damage an investigation if released.  
 
6. Reevaluation 
Agency administrators must institute a procedure to assess the value and 
effectiveness of intelligence products. The assessment should involve the consumers of 
the information including the investigators and uniformed officers at the level of 
execution.  
The continuous evaluation of the intelligence process should be the basis for 





C. THE CURRENT NETWORK 
The law enforcement intelligence network is used primarily as a crime prevention 
tool. Traditional crime analysis involves sifting through crime reports within a 
jurisdiction looking for similarities that might indicate pattern crimes or recognizable 
trends. Indicators from crimes in local jurisdictions are now being shared among law 
enforcement agencies via the network. By comparing the indicators from neighboring 
jurisdictions, analysts are better able to recognize certain crime trends and patterns. 
Agencies use the information to develop strategies to arrest offenders and prevent future 
crimes. The communications link that exists among law enforcement intelligence units 
provides the ability for analysts to identify crime patterns and trends that exist beyond 
jurisdictional boundaries. 
Inter-agency cooperation in a Federal, State, and local counter-terrorism 
intelligence network expands the nation's ability to detect criminal activity related to 
terror groups and the individuals and groups that provide their financial and logistic 
support. Prior to the 9/11 terror attacks there were legal and cultural obstacles for active 
integration of law enforcement intelligence with the Intelligence Community. The attacks 
demonstrated the ability of an adversary to operate both outside the U.S. and within our 
borders and created incentive for the melding of the resources of the Intelligence 
Community with those of law enforcement. Some of the restrictions that prevented 
Federal agencies from sharing information were removed by Executive Order issued in 
August of 2004.14 Positive steps have been taken by the Federal Government and many 
State Governments to integrate intelligence functions, but a single link between 
intelligence units has yet to be created.  
In the years since the attacks there have been constant complaints about a lack of 
specificity in the information provided to local police agencies. Many local officials have 
complained that their agencies are often asked to provide enhanced security at 
infrastructure locations based on incomplete information. In response, the FBI has 
developed a program in which local law enforcement agencies can designate a number of 
                                                 
14 U.S. President, Executive Order. “Executive Order Strengthening the Sharing of Terrorism 
Information to Protect Americans” (27 August 2004) available online: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/08/20040827-4.html. Last accessed 05/20/05. 
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“decision makers” who could apply for Secret security clearances. The Secret 
classification would allow local agencies to have access to information that could be used 
by the police, and also to provide the private agencies with a sanitized version to facilitate 
a more expansive security response. In addition to the Secret information, there are many 
new sources of official information available to local police agencies. Most police 
agencies have members who are able to cull open-source material from the constant 
stream of terrorism information classified as “Law Enforcement Sensitive” or “For 
Official Use Only” (FOUO).   
Federal agencies control and regulate information that is classified as 
Confidential, Secret, and Top Secret.15 Since State and local agencies do not have the 
ability to classify information as Confidential, Secret, or Top Secret, they rely on using a 
“Law Enforcement Sensitive” classification. This classification is intended to provide the 
ability to limit the distribution of sensitive information solely to other police agencies and 
agencies within the Intelligence Community (IC). Unfortunately this classification is not 
always respected. An inquiry using an internet search engine will provide links to posted 
documents that have the “Law Enforcement Sensitive' classification. There are at least 
two reasons that that this classification is ineffective: The first reason is that the 
classification is unofficial and there are no laws that prohibit the release beyond law 
enforcement members. The second reason is that it is often misused by law enforcement. 
A large amount of the intelligence distributed with a “Law Enforcement Sensitive” 
warning was collected from open sources such as news media.  
With law enforcement agencies becoming active participants of a domestic 
intelligence network it is apparent that the Federal Government must recognize the 
necessity of protecting information that will be used to prosecute a criminal case and to 
protect the undercover investigators or confidential informants who may be endangered if  
 
 
                                                 
15 U.S. President, Executive Order. “Classified National Security Information, Executive Order 
13929” (25 March 2003) available online: http://www.fas.org/sgp/bush/eoamend.html. Last accessed 
05/20/05. 
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the information is released. 16 The Government goes to great lengths to protect electronic 
collection sources, but fails to provide protection for the law enforcement professionals at 
the State and Local levels.  
The National Counter-Terrorism Center (NCTC) was established by Executive 
Order in August of 2004 to act as the primary organization within the U.S. Government 
for the analysis and integration of foreign and domestic intelligence related to terrorism. 
In addition to some other responsibilities, the NCTC serves as a shared knowledge bank 
on known and suspected terrorists and international terror groups. Since there is no direct 
line of communication between the NCTC and local law enforcement agencies, terrorism 
intelligence products are transmitted through agencies including the FBI, and DHS.17 The 
FBI currently issues numbered Counterterrorism Division Intelligence Bulletins. These 
documents are unclassified but usually contain the unofficial “For Official Use Only” or 
“Law Enforcement Sensitive” prohibition. To ensure distribution to all law enforcement 
agencies, the documents are sent to State Intelligence entities. The State entity then 
disseminates the bulletin to all law enforcement agencies within the state. Because these 
bulletins are released sporadically the numbering on the document makes it easy for local 
law enforcement agency to verify if any documents have not been received.  DHS does 
not number their unclassified intelligence reports so it is difficult to insure that all 
products have been received.  
The integration and coordination of these Federal, State, and local law 
enforcement agencies with agencies in the Intelligence Community will help close some 
intelligence gaps that currently exist, and reduce the terrorist’s ability to operate in the 
United States. Until a single source for the transmission of data and intelligence is 
developed, analysts must visit several electronic sources in order to develop a 
comprehensive intelligence report, and more importantly, there is no method to insure 
that vital time sensitive intelligence is communicated to every agency that has a need for  
 
                                                 
16 NYPD Deputy Inspector Michael O’Neil, Commanding Officer NYPD Counter Terrorism 
Division. Interviewed by author, Brooklyn N.Y. (1 September 2005). 
17 U.S. Department of Justice, “The FBI’s Counterterrorism Program Since September 2001” (14 
April 2004) 65. Available online: http://www.fbi.gov/publications/commission/9-11commissionrep.pdf. 
Last accessed 12/15/05. 
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the information. Local agencies must keep State and Federal officials aware of the need 
for a primary electronic intelligence network that can link the Federal, State and local 
partners.  
Even without a single-source national link, the existing network enables 
participants to access a large pool of information and intelligence, and provides the 
ability to make local or proprietary data and intelligence available on a national level. 
Several national and regional information-sharing portals are used by the various 
members of the network. The Regional Information Sharing System (RISS) has been 
providing criminal intelligence dissemination to LEA's since 1973. In 2003, RISS 
implemented the Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange (ATIX) to provide a conduit for 
the exchange of intelligence specific to homeland security. The FBI's Law Enforcement 
Online (LEO) is an online service that provides participants with FBI intelligence 
products, as well as space for special interest groups, chat rooms, and topical focus areas.  
The Joint Regional Information Exchange System (JRIES) is one of the more 
effective methods for the electronic transmission of data and intelligence. Operating as a 
real-time secure virtual private network (VPN), all law enforcement participants that have 
been vetted and approved for access to the system can share data sources and collaborate 
on common investigations.18  
The current structure of the law enforcement intelligence network does provide a 
limited amount of protection from any wide dissemination of sensitive information. Since 
the network does not utilize a central repository of information, the vast majority of 
information is kept at the local level. Information exchanged between network 
participants is limited to information on recognized crime patterns or threats, and 
inquiries about active criminal investigations. If any participating agency knowingly, or 
unknowingly, collects personal information in violation of applicable privacy laws, the 
damage will likely be contained, and hopefully identified, at that local level. 
 
                                                 
18 Carter, Guide, 133. 
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D. FUSION CENTERS 
While many Federal, State, and local agencies have been producing quality 
intelligence products, there are issues that impede interagency intelligence sharing. Legal, 
procedural and cultural barriers add up to what the 9/11 Commission refers to as the 
“human or systemic resistance to sharing information”.19 The creation of Fusion Centers 
has become an effective method to overcome these sharing problems. 
Simply stated, the Fusion concept is the co-location of intelligence resources and 
analysts from Federal, State, and local agencies into one intelligence center. The benefit 
to co-location enables analysts to call upon the information and collection abilities of all 
participating agencies and then integrate that data to produce a more complete 
intelligence product. Information gathered and held by the individual participating may 
only prove useful when it is related and analyzed with information held by other 
agencies.  
The fusion model has evolved from existing law enforcement information-sharing 
networks.20 The ability to assign manpower to a fusion center is usually limited to 
agencies that have a large workforce, and a large intelligence budget. The participation of 
Federal and State partners adds considerable resources and also enables the distribution 
of the intelligence product to local law enforcement agencies that lack their own 
intelligence resources.  
                                                 
19 Kean, Hamilton, The 9/11 Commission Report, 416. 
20 NGA Center for Best Practices, Issue Brief: Establishing State Intelligence Fusion Centers, 
National Governor's Association (Washington D.C.  July 2005) at: 
http://www.nga.org/Files/pdf/FusionCenterIB.pdf. Last accessed 11/20/05. 
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E. INTELLIGENCE IN NIMS  
 
The National Incident Management System21 provides a structure for a 
nationwide approach to the management of natural and manmade disasters, and is 
designed to facilitate coordination between Federal, State, and local entities involved in 
the response to, or the recovery from a critical incident. Given that the NIMS protocol 
dictates that incident management must include a process for gathering, sharing, and 
managing incident-related information and intelligence, the intelligence network will be 
the most effective system to fill this role.  
The intelligence network has the ability to provide Incident Command with a 
better understanding of the nature of the incident, and its underlying causes. Incidents 
that have a criminal component, such as terror attacks, will rely upon the network to 
guide the investigation in identifying and arresting perpetrators. The intelligence 
capability enhances the ability to conduct accurate threat assessments, and then to 
disseminate the threat information to other jurisdictions so they can guard against 
potential coordinated attacks.  
The active communication links that are being used by some law enforcement 
could be used to coordinate the response of civilian and military interagency support 
                                                 
21 Federal Emergency Management Agency, The National Incident Management System. 
http://www.nimsonline.com/ics_org_charts/intel_2.htm. Last accessed 09/15/05. 
The analysis and sharing of information and intelligence are important 
elements of ICS. In this context, intelligence includes not only national 
security or other types of classified information but also other 
operational information, such as risk assessments, medical intelligence 
(i.e., surveillance), weather information, geospatial data, structural 
designs, toxic contaminant levels, and utilities and public works data, 
that may come from a variety of different sources. Traditionally, 
information and intelligence functions are located in the Planning 
Section. However, in exceptional situations, the IC may need to assign 
the information and intelligence functions to other parts of the ICS 
organization. In any case, information and intelligence must be 
appropriately analyzed and shared with personnel, designated by the 
IC, who have proper clearance and a “need-to-know” to ensure that 
they support decision-making. 
    – National Incident Management System 
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during crisis and consequence management situations. In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks 
many Federal, State and local agencies sent representatives to the New York City 
Emergency Operations Center to coordinate the multi-agency rescue, recovery and 
consequence mitigation efforts at the World Trade Center site. When a need was 
identified, EOC personnel went directly to the various representatives to secure help from 
their respective agencies. The agency representative made contact with his / her agency to 
see if resources could be directed to the affected area. Electronic resources available in 
the intelligence network, such as the Area Security Operations Command and Control 
(ASOCC) system,22 can improve this process because of its ability to create a “Virtual” 
Emergency Operations Centers, and to provide a secure system for transmittal of 
intelligence. Operations personnel can push resource requests via ASOCC directly to 
other agency headquarters creating improved inter-agency collaboration in support of 
both administrative functions and field operations. A real-time connection between 
ASOCC participants allows intelligence staff to monitor situations and maintain an 
understanding of critical events as they develop.23 The ASOCC system enhances the 
Common Operating Picture and as a result a coordinated civilian and military inter-
agency response to critical incidents. 
 
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
• The intelligence process takes place in every law enforcement agency, 
even those without a staff dedicated to providing intelligence analysis. 
Administrators should recognize the benefits of using intelligence in 
developing short and long term crime reduction and homeland security 
planning. 
• The National Counter-Terrorism Center is the primary organization within 
the U.S. Government for the analysis and integration of foreign and 
domestic intelligence related to terrorism. Law enforcement agencies 
receive unclassified intelligence developed at the National Counter-
Terrorism Center through intermediary agencies such as the FBI and DHS.  
 
                                                 
22 The Area Security Operations Command and Control System (ASSOC) is a secure communications 
portal available to law enforcement agencies that is able to provide a direct communications link between 
Federal, DoD, State, and local agencies throughout the United States. 
23 U.S. Department of Justice, Area Security Operations Command and Control System: Evaluation 
Report (Washington D.C. April 2005) http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/212187.pdf. Last accessed 
12/05/05. 
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Local agencies should press the NCTC to improve the process by creating 
a single path for the flow of intelligence, and to make more actionable and 
relevant intelligence available.   
• The FBI has instituted a program to provide Secret security clearances to 
decision makers in local law enforcement agencies. Local agencies should 
apply for the Secret classification and thereby access information that 
could be used to enhance local security plans and direct enforcement 
efforts. 
• Without a single-source national intelligence link, the law enforcement 
intelligence network enables participants to access a large pool of 
information and intelligence, and provides the ability to push local and 
proprietary data and intelligence up to the regional and national level. 
Local Agencies such utilize data sources such as RISS, ATIX, LEO, and 
JRIES to access and exchange information and intelligence. 
• Local agencies must push Federal officials to develop a primary electronic 
intelligence network that can link the Federal, State and local law 
enforcement partners. A single intelligence link with help to eliminate the 
gaps that exist between the NCTC and local agencies.  
• The co-location of multi-agency intelligence resources in a Fusion Center 
enables analysts to call upon the information and collection abilities of all 
participating agencies and then integrate that data to produce a more 
complete intelligence product. Although many agencies lack the resources 
to assign staff to a Fusion Center, the participating Federal and State 
agencies usually disseminate the resulting intelligence products to all local 
agencies.  
• NIMS has been adopted as the national model for critical incident 
management. Since NIMS protocol dictates that the incident command 
structure must include the ability to gather, share and manage incident-
related intelligence, the existing law enforcement intelligence should be 
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III. INTELLIGENCE LED POLICING 
Community Policing techniques have been accepted by law enforcement agencies 
throughout the country. Central among the primary tenants of Community Policing is the 
understanding that agencies must work together with the community to set policing 
priorities and to reduce crime. The community policing partnerships start when police 
administrators confer with community leaders but often the more profound collaboration 
develops when officers, at the level of operation, interact with private citizens. Positive 
interactions between the police and the public produce mutual understanding and 
common goals so that the police agency is able to adapt operations to meet the needs of 
the community more directly and precisely. Additionally, community collaborations help 
police agencies develop better environmental scanning and enhanced crime prevention.24 
Another benefit the law enforcement agencies have derived from Community 
Policing is structured problem solving techniques. Problem-Oriented-Policing is a 
Community Policing method that uses the SARA (Scanning, Analysis, Response, and 
Assessment) model as a way to recognize and prioritize problems, determine the actual 
cause of problems, develop a method to eliminate the problem, and assess the 
effectiveness of the response.  
When agencies use this method they stimulate officers' creativity and 
resourcefulness to eliminate the root causes of recurrent calls thereby decreasing crime, 
and increasing police morale and community satisfaction.25  
International terror groups have demonstrated their ability to integrate themselves 
into our society, and to use creative methods to achieve their goals. In addition to 
international terrorist groups, domestic groups that advocate terrorism as a tactic to cause 
societal change are living and working in local communities. Maximizing the ability of 
the intelligence network to fight these groups must involve the entire law enforcement 
system. By utilizing resources beyond those traditionally used in law enforcement, and 
                                                 
24 US Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services What is Community 
Policing? http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/?Item=36. Last accessed 01/14/06. 
25 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services “The SARA Model” 
available from website: http://www.popcenter.org/about-SARA.htm. Last accessed 01/14/06. 
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integrating all available resources into an information sharing structure, local police 
departments can increase the amount of information that is collected. The information 
can then be used to produce home-grown terrorism intelligence which will be more 
relevant for local policing needs than the “all-purpose” intelligence passed down from 
State and Federal sources. The intelligence requirements of State and local agencies are 
slightly different than those of Federal law enforcement agencies. In addition to 
investigating and prosecuting criminal acts as Federals do, State and local LEA's also 
strive to prevent criminal activity, which requires an enhanced level of situational 
awareness.26 It stands to reason that an enhanced level of local situational awareness 
would prove to be a powerful antiterrorist tool.  
Since the advent of modern policing, patrol officers have honed the ability to 
detect suspicious behavior in order to disrupt criminal enterprise. With the introduction of 
terror activity in the U.S. these same skills could be adapted to include the recognition of 
terrorist activities that may pose a danger to a much larger percentage of the populace. 
Modifying the focus of law enforcement officers requires providing them with the most 
complete picture of the known domestic threat posed by terror groups. Information 
regarding the motives, intentions, and tactics employed by terror groups may help an 
officer to recognize an otherwise overlooked condition or piece of evidence. For 
example, a newly emerging trend of domestic and international terror bombers is the use 
of Triacetonetriperoxide (TATP), which is a highly volatile, highly explosive compound 
that can be made in the home with commonly available chemicals, including hydrogen 
peroxide, acetone, and acids. While these compounds are routinely possessed by a 
majority of Americans, unusual amounts, concentrations, or the fact that all the 
components are co-located may indicate the intent to mix the chemicals for an unlawful 
purpose. Without knowledge of TATP and its components, officers could encounter a 
bomb maker during a routine interaction, see all the components necessary to produce 
TATP, but fail to recognize the importance of the situation. Armed with timely 
intelligence, the officer could take immediate action, or forward the information for 
further investigation. 
                                                 
26 Riley, et al, State and Local Intelligence in the War on Terrorism The Rand Corporation (Santa 
Monica 2005) 56 Http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND_MG394.pdf. Last accessed 
01/14/06. 
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Agencies routinely demand that officers need to report suspicious incidents 
encountered during their tour. Officers must be continually reminded that reporting 
information could enable an analyst to combine it with other information, and thereby 
recognize a larger criminal enterprise. Agencies should retrain officers who are known to 
keep information proprietary, and commend officers who report pertinent information. To 
close the communications loop, a process to ensure that relevant terror threat information 
is delivered back to the officers at the level of operation must also occur.  
The concept of intelligence-led policing brings community policing principles and 
practices into the homeland security effort. Close interactions between police agencies 
and the community give the police a greater understanding of the events, conditions, and 
frictions that could signal the possibility of terrorist activity. Patrol officers have constant 
interactions with the public and are uniquely positioned to serve as direct link between 
the LE intelligence network and the public. These officers act as the eyes and ears of the 
intelligence analysts because their duties require them to seek out criminal and suspicious 
activity in the communities they serve. The true value of this group is their knowledge of 
local individuals and groups, the races, nationalities and religions represented in the 
community, and the potential for extremism or terrorism. The officers often develop 
ability to recognize any abnormal or unusual conditions and behaviors that may 
develop.27 And while it may be natural to look for suspicious and illegal activities in 
areas and groups in which these activities are frequently found racial profiling is to be 
avoided. Officers walk a fine line between seeking out criminal behavior and the need to 
treat the vast majority of law-abiding citizens with the respect and trust they deserve. 
Modern problem solving techniques could be then employed to reduce tension if it 
appears to be developing within a community.  
Community policing partnerships increase the quality and quantity of information 
moving from community members to the law enforcement. The information can be used  
 
 
                                                 
27 U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance Intelligence-Led policing: The New 
Intelligence Architecture. (September 2005)  http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/pdf/IntelLedPolicing.pdf. Last 
accessed 11/05/05. 
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by the intelligence network to identify suspicious or criminal behavior, and the analysis 
can be used to efficiently allocate resources for the protection of critical infrastructure 
and other sensitive locations.  
One of the challenges that have developed for each law enforcement agency is 
deciding on the method and frequency of providing threat information to its workforce. 
Many agencies produce intelligence briefing newsletters designed to quickly, but 
asynchronously, pass relevant terrorism information to officers working different days, 
shifts, and locations. Administrators are forced to consider whether it is better to produce 
a daily intelligence briefing so that the motivated officers have the most current 
information, balanced with the understanding that producing frequent reports containing 
virtually no real intelligence related to terrorism (in actuality the document is merely a 
crime report labeled as a intelligence brief) will eventually lessen the importance of the 
document, and therefore critical intelligence may be ignored on the rare occasions that it 
is disseminated. As a result, many agencies have chosen to not produce intelligence 
briefings on a daily, or weekly basis, but to limit the production of the briefings to those 
times when viable terror intelligence is developed. This increases the importance of the 
documents and the relevant information is ultimately more memorable to the recipients. 
The downside to this is that it is impossible for an analyst to know what local information 
will resonate with members of the workforce, resulting in the recognition of suspicious 
behavior. 
A primary goal of the intelligence-led policing concept is engaging the 
community as partners in the homeland security effort; therefore create a local 
atmosphere inhospitable to any potential terror activity. It is not enough for police to 
collect and archive information. Rather, unclassified intelligence and relevant threat 
information can be used to educate the public about security issues, and the kinds of 
behaviors that should be reported to the police. New York State’s Operation Safeguard is 
an example of how intelligence-led policing techniques can be used as the basis of an 
anti-terrorism initiative. The New York State Office of Homeland Security (NYSOHS) 
has enlisted police departments throughout the State to join in this ongoing program 
intended to identify terrorist planning, surveillance, logistical operations, or any 
suspicious activity that might be a precursor to a terror event. 
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A. NEW YORK STATE OPERATION SAFEGUARD 
Operation Safeguard operates as a public outreach program designed to generate 
awareness in the private sectors by providing information regarding potential terrorist 
indicators and suspicious activities. Participating police agencies enlist local business 
owners to participate in this anti-terrorism program then conduct regular visits to provide 
timely threat information. Businesses are provided a certificate of participation, and a 
poster with instructions to report any suspicious activity to the New York State Toll-Free 
Tips line. All information generated by the program is recorded by the State, and 
forwarded to the responsible investigative agency. 
When the program was introduced in April of 2004 the NYSOHS had identified 
seventy categories of businesses and occupations that should be encouraged to 
participate. Since most local police agencies do not have the resources to handle such a 
large endeavor, the list of business types that should be actively visited was cut to twelve 
as of December 2005. The following twelve business types are considered most likely to 
be exploited by terrorists portraying themselves as legitimate customers seeking to 
purchase material, licenses, and/or services to covertly further a terror plot are: 
• Swimming Pool Supply Stores 
• Self Storage Facilities 
• Truck/Van/Car Rental Locations 
• Real Estate 
• Commercial Driving Schools 
• Amusement Parks / Mass Gathering 
• Agricultural Spraying 
• Agricultural and Fertilizer Supply:  
• Bulk Fuel 
• Chemical Facilities 
• Marinas / Boat Rentals and Sales 
• Hospitals / Ambulance Service 
Since the nature of this program requires regular interactions between the 
businesses and the local police department, Operation Safeguard helps to establish police 
/ business community relationships where none had existed, and also to strengthen 
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relationships that do exist. The contacts and interaction facilitate communication on 
matters relating to terrorism, crime and other matters of mutual concern. The program has 
an added benefit of directly engaging patrol officers and detectives in a proactive anti-
terrorism activity. Performing the business visits reinforces the anti-terrorism 
commitment of the agency, and ensures that the police officers are kept apprised of recent 
threat information 
In addition to the regular visits, Operation Safeguard can be used to address 
specific threats. On two occasions in the second half of 2005 the system was utilized to 
develop information, and to advise merchants about a potential threat. 
During October 2005, thousands of Operation Safeguard business locations were 
contacted based upon a specific, but unconfirmed, intelligence report that terrorists might 
be planning a chemical attack on the New York City Subway System.28  Locations such 
as chemical suppliers, self-storage facilities, and hardware and electrical supply locations 
were contacted and advised of the active investigation. On November 4, 2005, the 
NYSOHS released an advisory to police agencies within the state that requested 
Operation Safeguard contacts be made to radio control aircraft (RCA) clubs and hobby 
shops. The request, initiated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, was based upon a 
concern that an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) could be used in a terror attack. The 
following list of indicators is an abstract of information that was to be discussed with the 
targeted businesses: 
                                                 
28 The threat information was released to the public on October 6, 2005. 
http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/10/06/newyork.subways/. Last accessed 01/12/06. 
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The benefits possibly derived from adopting a program similar to Operation 
Safeguard include: 
• Increasing community involvement in the fight against terrorist activity. 
• Engaging local police officers in a proactive anti-terrorism effort. 
• Strengthening the local community policing relationships. 
• Creating a statewide business database. 
 
RCA Clubs should be alert for -  
• Requests to utilize facilities or gain access to club property without becoming 
a member. 
• Inquires regarding short-term memberships (i.e. weeks or months).  
• Individuals with high-end aircraft, who cannot exhibit rudimentary operational 
skills.  
• Inquiries by individuals who are interested in obtaining operating skills in a 
very abbreviated time frame. 
• Inquiries by individuals who are interested in modifying remote control gliders 
or model airplanes to enable them to carry a payload, especially installing still 
or video cameras. 
 
Hobby Shops should be alert for -  
• A large cash purchase(s) of remote control gliders or model airplanes by 
individuals who do not appear to be hobbyists. 
• Inquiries by individuals who are interested in modifying remote control gliders 
or model airplanes to enable them to carry a payload, especially installing still 
or video cameras. 
• A request to purchase gyro systems with digital readouts for remote controlled 
airplanes. (These are often used by the military in remote drones. These 
systems allow an airplane to continue on a pre-defined course, even if it loses 
radio contact with the transmitter.) 
• Unusual purchases of chemicals, solvents, propellants, rocket motors, igniters 
and radio-control equipment associated with various hobbies. 
• Unusual inquiries into Kite Aerial Photography, or KAP, which is an obscure 
hobby that could be used to conduct surveillance on potential targets, without 
attracting suspicion.  
 
Source: New York State Office of Homeland Security- Advisory Number 375, issued November 04, 
2005
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B. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The effort to reduce the threat and impact of terrorism in the United States 
requires the creation of a collaborative broad-based network response and law 
enforcement agencies are in a position to adapt the current intelligence network to 
provide a platform for this collaboration. The realities of budgeting and finite resources 
require the identification of strategies that are effective, but scalable so they can be 
employed regardless of the size of the agency. 
Adopting intelligence-led policing techniques will expand a law enforcement 
agency's ability to reduce crime and improve quality of life issues within their 
jurisdiction, and will help to identify terrorist activity, and to provide homeland security.  
• Administrators should take the time to understand how the intelligence 
process can be used to achieve the current and future policing goals of the 
agency. Intelligence and crime analysis should become the basis for 
developing long-term strategies and future plans. 
• Agencies should redouble efforts toward understanding the cultures, 
beliefs and traditions of the racial, religious and ethnic groups represented 
in the communities they serve. Special attention should be given to 
building rapport, establishing mutual trust and creating a commonality of 
purpose.  
• Intelligence should not be hoarded by intelligence analysts or a few select 
investigators. The national goal of enhancing homeland security will 
benefit from increasing the ability of all law enforcement personnel to 
access intelligence.  
The patrol force and other law enforcement members who interact with the public 
should become a conduit for transmitting threat and security information to their 
individual communities. Patrol officers are in the best position to recognize locations that 
could be vulnerable to a terror attack, or exploited by terrorist conducting pre-operational 
activities. Increasing interactions related to homeland security issues will increase the 
possibility that suspicious actions or conditions are reported.   
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IV. PUBLIC SECTOR AGENCIES 
In order to strengthen the intelligence network's ability to collect, analyze, and 
disseminate counter-terrorism intelligence, law enforcement agencies must encourage 
public agencies to become active network participants. Agencies such as Fire, Health, 
Social Services, Probation, and Public Works all employ members who work within local 
neighborhoods and have daily interaction with citizens enabling them to become force 
multipliers for law enforcement. If the public sector workforce is trained to recognize 
suspicious materials and behaviors, there will be an increased likelihood that pre-
operational terrorist activity will be recognized and reported for investigation. 
Additionally, providing current intelligence regarding the known tactics and suspected 
targets of terror groups would provide the agencies with the ability to effectively manage 
resources to harden targets and suggest when new training and defensive strategies may 
be needed to address changing threats.   
Building collaborative and cooperative inter-agency relationships will allow 
public agencies to support the national anti-terrorism mission. The communication that 
will result from this intelligence network will allow agencies to share response plans and 
should reduce friction during critical incidents. Many agencies have critical incident 
response plans, but few have developed the plans with a full understanding of how their 
response interacts with agencies from other disciplines. Communication between 
participants will provide the ability for agencies to develop accurate and coordinated 
recovery plans. Each agency brings its own unique capabilities and contributions that can 
be utilized by the intelligence network. 
 
A. PROSECUTORS 
As the lead law enforcement agent, prosecutors need to be kept apprised of 
developing patterns in domestic and international terrorism. As one example, the nature 
of human interaction has changed rapidly and dramatically since the onset of the cyber 
age. The internet, cellular telephones, and other means of electronic communication 
brings a certain anonymity that is being creatively exploited to facilitate criminal  
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behavior. Terror groups are using these technologies to meet, recruit, and train new 
members. The groups are also using these same technologies to raise operating funds and 
coordinate and control group operations.  
Including prosecutors in an information sharing network will keep them informed 
about known terror enterprises and tactics. This will foster mutual understanding and 
cooperation when the law enforcement agency seeks help for a warrant or attempts to 
bring charges against suspected terrorists. When necessary, prosecutors can seek 
legislative help in changing laws or enacting new laws that are needed to address 
emerging crime trends. 
Additionally, since the prosecutor spends a great deal more time with a case than 
the law enforcement agency did, they will amass a larger amount of knowledge about the 
suspect and his motives.  Most prosecutors also receive criminal cases from many 
different law enforcement agencies. This gives prosecutors the potential to recognize 
links or patterns of criminal behavior that may have gone unnoticed by the law 
enforcement intelligence network. 
 
1. Fire Services 
The core function of fire service agencies is in response to active fires. The need 
for fire response is almost always unexpected and does not allow time for residents to 
hide evidence of illegal activity. Fire service agencies also gain access to public and 
private building throughout our local communities when performing regular fire code 
inspections. This level of access gives Fire Fighters the ability to observe materials that 
might be used to plan a terror operation, or substances that may be stockpiled for use in 
an attack.  
Many fire service agencies are also trained to respond to incidents involving 
Hazardous Materials. Since the majority of Haz-Mat incidents involve industrial or 
transportation accidents with little, or no criminality, keeping Haz-Mat technicians fully 
informed about known threats and tactics will reduce complacency. The failure to quickly 
recognize an attack might result in the destruction of key evidence, and the failure to 
make notifications which would allow other first responders to protect against possible  
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coordinated attacks. Additionally, failing to recognize an attack will to make fire fighters 
vulnerable to secondary attacks, or devices which may have been aimed at first 
responders.  
Including the Fire Service agencies in the counter-terrorism intelligence network 
will increase the number of trained individuals watching for suspicious situations, and 
will increase the amount of information gathered. Providing the Fire personnel with 
relevant intelligence may reduce their vulnerability to sustaining injury during a terror 
attack, and may aid in the preservation of evidence needed for criminal prosecution.    
 
2. Emergency Medical Services 
As with the Fire Services, the Emergency Medical Services operate primarily in 
the response mode. Like the Fire Services, EMS personnel enter homes and private 
buildings during the normal course of their duties. This access would allow informed 
medical technicians to recognize suspicious materials or circumstances that might be 
present in private residences and businesses. Medical technicians also have the ability to 
investigate the causation of injuries. If a patient is exhibiting signs or symptoms 
consistent with exposure to hazardous chemicals or substances, the technician could 
summon the police to investigate, or take note of evidence or testimony, which might be 
useful in a prosecution.  
 
3. Health Department 
The network of Federal, State, and local public health agencies are the primary 
source of syndromic surveillance and are likely to be the first to detect illness or injury 
patterns resulting from a biological, chemical, or radiological terror attack. The actions of 
public health agencies, along with physicians, nurses, and other healthcare providers, are 
guided by effective protocols for reporting identified illnesses. Additionally, these 
agencies possess information that would be vitally important to law enforcement 
agencies, such as plans and procedures to distribute medication in response to mass 
contaminations, and procedures to expedite the response to mass casualty incidents.  
Bioterrorism, pandemic influenza, or infectious diseases are usually viewed as 
conditions in which law enforcement will have to collaborate with public health, but in 
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fact the aftermath of any natural or man-made disaster will usually create a aftermath of 
disease or other health issues that will require public health's involvement.29 During the 
rescue and recovery operations at the World Trade Center site in 2001, the NYC 
Department of Health worked closely with first responder agencies to determine the level 
of danger that responders and the public faced from the ambient air, and other 
contaminants. 
The Health Department’s participation in a counter-terrorism intelligence network 
will increase the flow of communication between the agencies. Law enforcement 
agencies can provide the health department with current terrorism intelligence that may 
facilitate their planning, and may speed in the detection of an attack. This communication 
system will also allow the health department to keep law enforcement informed regarding 
the hazards of potential Biological / Chemical attacks. This information will facilitate the 
development of accurate contingency plans within the law enforcement community.  
In addition, the Health Department is the conduit for requesting the deployment of 
the Strategic National Stockpile of medical supplies. It would be beneficial during a mass 
casualty incident or weapons of mass effect (WME) emergency if the law enforcement 
agency had an established and active method of communication with the Health 
Department.  
 
4. Public Works 
The Public Works Department could prove to be a valuable source of information 
to the intelligence network.  Public Works employees are in a unique position to notice 
trash or refuse that might identify suspicious activity. If the workforce is informed about 
trends in bomb making, or components of WME’s, then they would be more likely to 
report seeing unusual quantities of these materials. Building Inspectors employed by 
Public Works regularly inspect public and private buildings, as well as private residences 
for compliance with local building codes. Providing these individuals with terrorism 
intelligence would increase their ability to recognize and report suspicious activity.  
                                                 
29 National Governor's Association  NGA Center for Best Practices, Issue Brief, State Strategies for 
Fully Integrating Public Health into Homeland Security (Washington D.C.  November 2005) from: 
http://www.nga.org/Files/pdf/FULLYPUBLICHEALTH.pdf. Last accessed 01/19/06.  
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B. THE LOS ANGELES TERRORISM EARLY WARNING GROUP  
Intelligence Fusion center participants have typically been limited to law 
enforcement, military, and intelligence agencies. The Los Angeles Terrorism Early 
Warning Group (TEW) is a model of how the resources and expertise of non-law 
enforcement public agencies can be integrated with those of the law enforcement 
intelligence network. This collaborative effort provides the ability for coordinated 
planning and response to acts of terrorism.30 The TEW was designed to provide a 
regional coordinated response to terrorism in an area that is home to over 10 million 
residents, and served by 48 police departments, 38 fire departments, and many other 
public agencies.  
The core participating agencies in the TEW include the Los Angeles County 
Sheriff's Department, Los Angeles Police Department, Los Angeles Fire Department, Los 
Angeles County Fire Department, Los Angeles County Health Department, and the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation. In total, there are approximately thirty Federal, State and 
local participants, including, law enforcement, fire services, health agencies, emergency 
management, universities, airports, and transportation. The Los Angeles Sheriff's 
department acts as the Secretariat providing the facility and handling arrangements for 
meeting, training sessions, and communications, but the TEW uses the Unified Command 
structure for direction and decision-making purposes. The ability to access information 
from any of the participating agencies, combined with the ability to leverage the 
collective knowledge and experience, provides a unique ability to achieve comprehensive 
situational understanding. 
According to its mission statement, the TEW is charged with “analyzing the 
Strategic and operational information needed to respond to and combat terrorism and 
protect critical infrastructure.” TEW monitors multi-source information regarding trends 
and assesses any potential terrorist threat to the Los Angeles region. The assessments 
produced by TEW analysts are used to guide prevention and mitigation efforts by 
agencies throughout the region. 
                                                 
30 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Terror Early Warning Group” (2005) available on line: 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/docs/TEWBrochure.pdf#search='Los%20Angeles%20Terrorism%20Early%
20Warning%20Group. Last accessed 01/06/06. 
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In order to facilitate communication between the TEW and its members, each 
participating agency designates a Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLO) to act as the conduit 
of information.  This TLO system provides a method to ensure that information flows 
between the agencies and the TEW. 
In order to carry out all the functions in the Intelligence Process the TEW is 
organized into a structure of six cells with separate but interconnected functions.31 
1. Officer-in-Charge (OIC/Command): oversees processes of the TEW, 
sets intelligence requirements, and is a link to the Unified Command structure.  
2. Analysis/Synthesis: coordinates analysis and assessment activities – 
assigning requests for information to the appropriate cells, and developing the results into 
actionable intelligence products. 
3. Consequence Management: assesses law enforcement, fire service, and 
health consequences of events by assessing real-time situation and resource status. 
4. Investigative Liaison: coordinates with investigation and intelligence 
teams from Federal, State, and local agencies. 
5. Epidemiological Intelligence: responsible for real-time disease 
surveillance, food and water surety, agricultural threat issues, and coordination with the 
disease investigation. 
6. Forensic Intelligence Support: provides technical support, chemical, 
biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive (CBRNE) reconnaissance, geospatial 
intelligence (mapping, imagery and modeling products), and coordinates “virtual 





                                                 





Figure 2.   TEW Net Assessment Organization 
 
Relationships between police and public agencies do exist, but prior to 9/11, there 
was very little incentive for police agencies to share intelligence resources. The paradigm 
change following the 9/11 attacks has created a desire for information and intelligence on 
terrorist activities by the public. The paradigm change has also created pressure for these 
agencies to find new and creative ways to ensure the safety of the public and the national 
infrastructure. There is an opportunity for both sides to forge a new mindset of 
cooperation in the effort to enhance homeland security.  
Building a new structure of cooperation and coordination will require the 
increased communication between participants. The establishment of information and 
intelligence sharing networks between police agencies and other public sector agencies 
can provide an opportunity to develop systems that will be beneficial in ensuring the 
public safety. Communication will also help to reduce the cultural differences that 
currently divide the disciplines. Engaging public sector employees into a counter-
terrorism intelligence function and providing them with accurate threat information may 
also help to reduce unwarranted fears and increase the likelihood that they will continue  
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to perform vital functions during or after a terror attack. Creating a shared anti-terror 
mission could act as a form of psychological first aid32 to limit distress and other adverse 
health consequences. 
The network should provide the ability to transfer terrorist information and 
intelligence to all the partner agencies based upon their individual needs. The National 
Plan for Research and Development in Support of Critical Infrastructure recommends 
the development and implementation of systems that “provide an integrated view of 
societal risks from terrorist events, natural disasters, and other emergencies for 
incorporation in decision support systems to anticipate and evaluate alternative risk 
reduction investments and emergency response decisions.”33  
 
C. WORK GROUPS  
Sharing intelligence is not enough. The true basis of an effective local counter-
terrorism network is creating a collaborative effort that can be used to further each 
agency's individual counter-terrorism mission.34  
Creating a usable product takes commitment and creativity on the part of the 
Intelligence Analyst. The law enforcement analyst must examine data with an 
understanding of each partner agency's individual needs. The most functional way to 
keep the law enforcement analyst aware of these needs is through direct communication 
and feedback. Regularly scheduled work group meetings will help to build mutual 
understanding of partner agencies' abilities and limitations. The meetings will also help to 
coordinate actions between the partner agencies and ensure that the true meaning of the 
information is understood. Developing a work group will keep local network participants 
informed about current trends and tactics of terror groups, provide an additional conduit 
for reporting suspicious activity, and can be used to discuss communications or 
                                                 
32 Adrienne Stith Butler, Allison M. Panzer, Lewis R. Goldfrank, Ed., Developing Strategies for 
Minimizing the Psychological Consequences of Terrorism Through Prevention, Intervention, and Health 
Promotion (2003, National Academy of Sciences). 
33 Department of Homeland Security. The National Plan for Research and Development in Support of 
Critical Infrastructure Protection. Xi, at: 
http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/ST_2004_NCIP_RD_PlanFINALApr05.pdf. Last accessed 
11/20/05. 
34 Loyka PERF, 5. 
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technology issues that may arise. A person-to-person structure of inter-agency 
communication will greatly enhance the department’s ability to interact with network 
partners. If the law enforcement analysts develop an understanding of how intelligence 
can be used by partner agencies, they can become attentive to data that may have 
otherwise gone unnoticed.  
Partner agencies should designate a member of their workforce to act as the 
network point-of-contact, adopting the Terrorism Liaison Officer model used in the 
TEW. The TLO's should monitor all the interactions associated with their agency's 
participation, and have a line of communication to their Chief Officer in order to ensure 
that the exchange of information does not deviate from the agency’s mission. 
Expanding the law enforcement network to include other public sector agencies is 
a “force multiplier” in local anti-terrorism efforts. Public agencies can participate by 
working together in response and recovery planning, and by educating their workforce so 
that they can recognize and report potential terror activity. Managing the expanded 
network requires strict monitoring to ensure that essential liberties are not violated in the 
effort to provide security. This public network must operate with a degree of transparency 
so that advocacy groups and the media can understand the goals of the program and help 
the agencies to ensure that they are meeting the public’s expectations.     
 
D. DISSEMINATING INTELLIGENCE 
 
 
In his Guide for State, Local, and Tribal Law Enforcement Agencies, Dr. David 
L. Carter provides general rules for the release of information. He advocates the 
The different forms of intelligence can guide investigations; provide 
insights for resource allocation; suggest when priorities should be 
expanded or changed; suggest when new training and procedures may 
be needed to address changing threats; and permit insight when there is 
a change in the threat level within a specific community or region.   
     –David L. Carter 
Guide for State, Local, and Tribal  
Law Enforcement Agencies 
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preparation of two versions of an intelligence product if it becomes necessary to release 
information outside of law enforcement, an unclassified public version, and a “Law 
Enforcement Sensitive” version.35 The Law Enforcement Sensitive version would 
provide more detailed information about suspected terrorists. He makes the claim that “If 
there is a credible threat to a civilian target it may become necessary that both strategic 
intelligence and tactical intelligence be disseminated as quickly as possible.”36 Carter 
defines tactical intelligence as information used to facilitate decision-making during an 
immediate crisis: the “who, what, when, and where.” He defines strategic intelligence as 
the characteristics, structure and philosophy of the suspected terror group. 
Recent improvements in technology allow member agencies to collect, analyze, 
and disseminate information at a much quicker rate than in the past. The “sensitive but 
secure” information can be disseminated to partner agencies via fax, email or radio 
conferencing cell phones. Relevant but less timely information can be shared over web 
logs administered by the police agency. For example, a web log might post information 
on missing hospital uniforms. This information is of minor importance unless other 
participants have found potentially related conditions such as ambulances that are 
missing license plates, or unqualified persons seeking credentials as emergency 
responders. Exchanges of this sort would keep the police apprised of suspicious behavior 
or minor criminal activities that might otherwise go unreported.  
 
1. Ethical Issues of Sharing Intelligence with Public Agencies 
The global war on terror is a continuing effort to protect the values to our nation 
and the safety of our citizens. Law Enforcement’s ability to collect information about 
civilians is regulated and monitored to ensure that civil rights are not violated. If law 
enforcement agencies are going to exchange information with other public agencies there 
must be a balance between the need to ensure public safety and the equally important 
need to preserve civil rights and the public trust.  
                                                 
35 David L. Carter PhD, Guide for State, Local, and Tribal Law Enforcement Agencies. (East Lansing: 
Michigan State University, 2004, 2-4. http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/Default.asp?Item-1404. Last accessed 
11/22/05. 
36 Carter, Guide. 4. 
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Civil rights organizations will require assurances that public sector information 
will not be used in domestic spying or illegal information collection. Law enforcement 
agencies must reassure these groups that any leads coming from public agencies will be 
investigated to see if there is any potential criminal or terrorist activity. If the 
investigation rules out criminality, the information will be protected to prevent its use in 
profiling, denial of services, or infringement of civil liberties. For example, some 
advocacy groups will certainly be fearful that the program's intent is to use the public 
sector employees in identifying illegal aliens for deportation. Suspicion of the program 
could cause emergencies to go unreported or prevent individuals from requesting life 
sustaining help from the public assistance agencies if individuals fear having their 
personal information available to the intelligence network. 
An effective way to eliminate misconceptions about the purpose of the program is 
to inform these local groups at the onset about the safeguards utilized to prevent illegal or 
unethical use of personal information. There needs to be sufficient oversight in place to 
alleviate fears of privacy infringement and to protect the rights of the local population. 
The news media could surely play a role in how this program is accepted by the public, 
but may also be used to further the goals of the program. The best way to prepare for 
media scrutiny is to limit the program to its intended goals of detecting terrorist activity, 
and to continuously monitor the program both from the law enforcement end to ensure 
that rights are not violated, and from the public sector end to ensure that the mechanics of 
the program do not interfere with the mission of the participating agencies. Providing the 
media with an overview of the program, and allowing them access to interview 
employees at the level of operation would help to remove suspicions regarding violation 
of privacy laws, or actions against the public trust.  
The media coverage may also contribute to the success of the program by 
conveying the impression that the jurisdiction is hyper-vigilant, and a problematic 
location for terror activity. Public Information Officers should inform the mass media 
that public agencies are working together to prevent terrorist activity and to develop 
response and recovery plans.    
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E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Combining the resources of local law enforcement agencies with the resources of 
the public and private sector is an important step in developing a network response to 
homeland security issues and the protection of vital infrastructure. The system of 
exchanging information / intelligence between partner agencies could be incorporated as 
part of an agency's intelligence-led policing strategy. Even smaller law enforcement 
agencies with limited resources can become a communications conduit between local 
public agencies and a State or regional law enforcement intelligence system.  
• Law enforcement agencies should institute regular electronic 
communications with public agencies to create a coordinated and 
cooperative local effort to fight terrorism and enhance homeland security.  
• All partner agencies should designate a member of their workforce to act 
as the network point-of-contact, adopting the Terrorism Liaison Officer 
model used in the TEW. This contact person should monitor all the 
interactions associated with their network participation, and have a line of 
communication to their agency's Chief Officer in order to ensure that the 
exchange of information does not negatively affect their agency's mission. 
• In addition to the electronic communication, each law enforcement agency 
should conduct regularly scheduled working group meetings to build 
mutual understanding of each partner agency's strengths, limitations and 
their ability to contribute to the effort. The working group meetings should 
also be used to coordinate preparedness issues and planning. 
• Law enforcement agencies should create two forms of the intelligence 
product. One version should be “law enforcement sensitive” and contain 
the information needed for law enforcement purposes. The other version 
should be “Public Sector Sensitive” and contain information that would be 
useful to public agencies.  
• All sharing of information between law enforcement and other public 
agencies should be limited to that which is allowed by law, and should not 
violate civil rights, or the public trust.   
• Law enforcement agencies should conduct regular reviews of intelligence 
cases to determine if the goals of the expanded network are being attained 
and essential liberties are being protected. 
• Dissemination Review- All information that will be released from the 
Intelligence Unit to the public agency partners should be rechecked to 
ensure that it will not endanger any active investigations or sources.  
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V. PRIVATE SECTOR AGENCIES 
 
 
A. THE POST-9/11 PARADIGM SHIFT FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT, AND 
THE NEED FOR CHANGE 
In light of the additional burdens that have been recognized in the five years since 
the 9/11 terrorist attacks, we should acknowledge that law enforcement agencies do not 
have the capacity to provide complete security coverage within their jurisdictions. Law 
enforcement agencies usually have patrol assets, and they have the ability to access 
terrorist threat information, but most do not have the capacity to provide real security at 
the infinite number of potential terrorist targets. The vast majority of these potential 
targets are owned and protected by private sector entities.  
In order to enhance local law enforcement’s ability to attain the strategic goals 
outlined in the National Strategy for Homeland Security,37 it is essential to incorporate 
the resources that are available in the private sector. According to the Gilmore 
Commission’s Second Report, approximately 85% of the nation’s workforce and 
infrastructure is controlled by the private sector.38 Based upon a suspected threat, 
members of law enforcement agencies have the authority to consult with, and even assist 
the private sector in increasing security at privately controlled locations. Police agencies 
have the legal authority in criminal matters, but generally have little understanding of the 
                                                 
37 The National Strategy for Homeland Security. 
38 U.S. Congress. The Gilmore Commission Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response  
Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction. Santa Monica: the RAND Corporation, 
2002.  
More than anything else, homeland security in the 21st century is 
about the integration of an entire nation, as well as, depending on the 
circumstances, the integration of nations themselves. It’s a philosophy 
of shared responsibility, shared leadership and shared accountability. 
And the private sector has a critically important role to play in this all-
hands effort. We need partners in the private sector that will stand up 
and be counted as any regular citizen, partners that take an active 
forward-leaning view of security at all times. 
– Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge,    
Cargo Security Summit, Washington, DC, 16 December 2004.  
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broad range of private security functions, expertise, and resources, and often fail to 
appreciate the role of private security.39 It is more than likely that the persons who have 
the daily responsibility for protecting the location will have a better understanding of the 
possible vulnerabilities, the ramifications of a successful attack, and the best way to 
increase security to protect against an attack.  
Regardless of the anti-terrorism and counter-terrorism efforts undertaken at either 
the public or the private level, the possibility of a successful attack cannot be discounted. 
Based on that understanding, most private sector security providers make provisions to 
ensure the continuity of their business operations after natural or man-made disasters. 
Many companies have built redundancies into their daily operations, secondary 
information technology sites, cooperative agreements with similar agencies, and other 
contingency planning to recover or replace affected assets so they can resume normal 
operations as soon as possible. Ironically, the intelligence that the private sector could 
surely use to defend against, or quickly recover from an attack is the same intelligence 
that law enforcement is often unable or unwilling to share. 
Utilizing the vast resources available in the private sector requires the 
development of a new structure of coordination and cooperation between local law 
enforcement agencies and private companies. A recent study conducted in cooperation 
with the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) by the Justice Department’s 
Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) corroborates this claim. According to 
Private Security/Public Policing Partnerships in 2000 there were 17,784 state and local 
law enforcement agencies in the United States, employing 708,000 full-time sworn 
officers. In addition, there were 88,500 federal law enforcement officers, bringing the 
public total to about 797,000 public law enforcement officers.40 By contrast, recent 
studies of private security suggest there may be as many as 90,000 private security 
organizations employing roughly 2 million security officers in the United States.41 The 
study suggested, however, that only five to ten percent of law enforcement chief 
                                                 
39 U.S. Congress. The Gilmore Commission. 
40 IACP, COPS. 2004. Private Security/Public Policing Partnerships. 2  
http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/mime/open.pdf?Item=1355. Last accessed 12/08/05. 
41 Ibid. 2. 
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executives participate in any collaborative partnerships with private security. Similarly, 
emergency response exercises tend to include police, fire, public health, and other 
governmental authorities but exclude agencies responsible for private security. The study 
recommends that leaders of the major law enforcement and private security organizations 
should endorse the implementation of sustainable public–private partnerships in order to 
address terrorism, public disorder, and crime. The paper advocates several ways to bridge 
the gap, such as communication networks, joint training seminars, and the establishment 
of public/private professional organizations.42 
In an article published in Foreign Policy Magazine, David Rothkopf also 
advocates private industry’s participation in the war on terror. He says, “…private-sector 
players can deploy innovative technologies and unlimited financing to fort U.S. cities, 
battle cyber threats, track the movements of terrorists, and disarm biological weapons.”43  
In spite of the benefits, Rothkopf believes the majority of federal, state, and local 
agencies have yet to take advantage of the resources offered by private sector 
organizations. He claims that “to date, these companies have been involved in very little 
of the coordinated planning, drilling exercises, threat evaluation, intelligence sharing, 
cooperative research, or any of the other steps a national defense strategy requires.”44  
If a “secure but sensitive” information network is to succeed, the potential 
benefits of participation will surely have to outweigh the costs. For the law enforcement 
agency, the benefit will be increased security at critical infrastructure sites, as well as 
enhanced ability to collect information about terrorism and other criminal activity from 
private sector participants. The cost for the law enforcement agency will be the 
investment in resources such as manpower, IT equipment, and office space. Many local 
law enforcement agencies currently maintain an Intelligence Unit that would provide the 
expertise in disseminating information.  
Private companies, by necessity, make most decisions based upon economic 
factors; with regard to terrorism, there are other incentives for cooperation. The prospect 
of losing company assets and or employees to a terror event should provide the necessary                                                  
42 IACP, COPS, 3. 
43 David J. Rothkopf, “Business versus Terror.” Foreign Policy130 (May/June 2002): 56. 
44 IACP/COPS, 57. 
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incentives for private sector decision- makers to make the relatively low-cost investment 
in network participation. The companies could assign manpower to receive the terrorist 
information, and then transmit it to any employee who deals with security concerns. The 
company would also communicate any suspicious behavior or other relevant information 
back to the law enforcement agency. As Dr. Ruth David explains, “The need for timely 
sharing of information… is well documented--but unfulfilled.” She points out the need 
for information to be shared with the private corporations who “own and operate much of 
the nation’s infrastructure--and may be directly targeted for attack.”45 
Since there is a paucity of viable terrorist information available to local police 
agencies, the network needs to transmit other information of mutual interest in order to 
maintain the program. Transmitting reports of crimes that just occurred, with descriptions 
of offenders, will allow the police agency to increase the number of eyes looking for a 
fleeing suspect.  This enhancement of crime-fighting resources becomes a value-added 
benefit to police agencies looking to close cases. The value-added benefit for the private 
agency is the quick access to information they would otherwise not have. The police 
agency could transmit information about road closures to network participants, who could 
then re-route their fleets around congested traffic. Information transmitted on crime 
patterns, or crimes that just occurred, would allow private agencies to take temporary or 
precautionary measures. For example, if a banking concern received alerts about a subject 
who just robbed two banks in the area, they could prepare dye packs, or alert the police if 
the subject tried to enter one of their bank locations. 
 
1. Ethical Issues of Sharing Intelligence with Private Agencies 
Just as with public agencies, the exchange of information between law 
enforcement and private agencies must be balanced between the need to ensure public 
safety and the equally important need to preserve civil rights and to public trust. Law 
enforcement agencies must ensure that any sharing of information between law 
enforcement and private agencies is limited to that which is allowed by law, and does not 
violate civil rights, or target any ethnic, racial or religious group.  Transparency and 
                                                 
45 Ruth David, “Homeland Security Technologies: Creating an Asymmetric Advantage.” Journal of 
Homeland Security, 2002: 24.  
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openness with the news media and with civil rights groups regarding the goals and 
practices of program will help to alleviate misunderstanding. Publicity of the public / 
private partnership will also contribute to increasing public awareness of homeland 
security issues, and build public confidence.  
 
B. THE SECURITY POLICE INFORMATION NETWORK 
Although many officials in the field of homeland security are calling for the 
creation of information sharing partnerships, there are very few active, successful 
programs. The Nassau County Police Department’s Security Police Information Network 
(SPIN) is an example of an effective, active information-sharing network. Few 
information networks of this nature are currently providing timely dissemination of 
information from the federal government to state and local law enforcement agencies and 
onto private infrastructure and security officials. SPIN was designed to be a crime 
prevention partnership between the Nassau County Police Department (NCPD) and the 
private sector that seeks to increase public safety through the sharing of important and 
timely information. The program was started in August 2004 in order to incorporate the 
resources of the private sector into Nassau County’s effort to fight terrorist activity. 
As outlined in Chapter III, community policing strategies call upon law 
enforcement agencies to develop relationships with various sectors of the community. 
Police departments meet regularly with local clergy, business groups, neighborhood 
associations, and other groups. Prior to 9/11, there was little contact with corporate 
security directors or managers of security businesses.46 Since the establishment of SPIN, 
NCPD administrators have been in contact with business groups and associations to 
encourage participation. As of December 2005, the NCPD has vetted over 900 individual 
participants into the program, and is actively recruiting additional members. The vetting 
process is comprised of local background and criminal history checks performed by the 
department’s Applicant Investigation Unit. The vetting process has so far shown that 
most applicants have a great deal of training, and have New York State certifications in 
security- and law enforcement-related fields. Many of the applicants are former federal, 
state, or local law enforcement officers.  
                                                 
46 IACP and COPS, Private Security/Public Policing Partnerships, 24.  
46 
The stated goals of SPIN are to share information, identify and discuss crime 
trends and solutions, work together toward the common goal of protection of persons and 
assets, and create a better working relationship between law enforcement and the private 
sector.47 SPIN members are contacted by email or text messaging and informed of 
unfolding situations as they occur. Messages include terror threat information, bank 
robberies (and attempts), major road closures, disruptions in public transportation, major 
fires or explosions, suspicious packages or circumstances, civil disturbance, public health 
or weather-related emergencies, or any other situations involving public safety or 
affecting continuity of business. Members of the group are able to exchange information 
about planned evacuation drills or other safety matters. In addition, monthly meetings are 
held to discuss timely security-related issues.  
The establishment of such a comprehensive network has far-reaching 
applications. From assisting in the capture of felony suspects or notification of the latest 
crime trends, to helping business to do business through traffic delay notifications, SPIN 
can facilitate the large-scale exchange of information. The Network also provides the 
ability to distribute training materials that may enhance the safety of everyone who lives 
or works in Nassau County.48 
SPIN enables the police department to send out information tailored to specific 
sectors of private industry. Each sector (colleges and universities, hospitals, grade 
schools, malls and retail businesses, utility companies, petroleum companies, technology 
companies, hotels and motels, financial institutions, and corporate security) is sorted into 
its own email distribution sub-group as well as a general distribution group. The sub-
group members receive sector-specific information. An unspecified threat against 
electrical power plants would go only to the utilities group; threats to schools go only to 
the education group, and so on. These categories mirror the ones utilized by the 
Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) operated by the Department of 
Homeland Security.49 HSIN provides a Critical Infrastructure Morning Briefing 
                                                 
47 Nassau County Police Department Deputy Inspector Matthew Simeone, interview by author, 
Mineola, NY, 5 January 2005. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Homeland Security Information Network, at 
http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/press_release/press_release_0354.xml.  Last accessed 03/02/06. 
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newsletter, which is disseminated over SPIN. The newsletter provides open-source 
intelligence separated into the listed categories. In addition, SPIN messages are sent to all 
law enforcement agencies operating in Nassau County, as well as Metropolitan 
Transportation Authority police, and other federal, state or local agencies in adjoining 
counties.50  
A continuous challenge is deciding how to disseminate intelligence to the various 
law enforcement and security partners. NCPD analysts create two versions of relevant 
counter terrorism intelligence, a “Law Enforcement Sensitive” version and a “Sensitive 
but Secure” version that omits any classified or restricted material. The “sensitive but 
secure” information is disseminated to SPIN network participants via fax or email. The 
NCPD is considering the implementation of industry-specific web logs to transmit 
relevant but less timely information. For example, a web log set up for utility companies 
might post information about damaged locks found at un-manned facilities. This 
information is of minor importance unless other companies have found similar conditions 
at their facilities. Exchanges of this sort would keep the police apprised of potentially 
important activities that might otherwise go unreported.  
In order for this network to succeed in enhancing counter terrorism strategies, 
agency partners must understand the need to act on the intelligence, promptly transmit the 
information throughout their workforce, and to report any relevant incidents or 
circumstances back to the Intelligence Unit. 
Administration of a public/private communications network has associated costs, 
such as physical facilities, IT equipment, staffing, and training issues. Department 
officials have considered charging private security agencies to participate in the network, 
but have not instituted such a fee because of indications that the fee might cause smaller 
companies to drop out of the program. To date, the NCPD has absorbed all costs into its 
operating budget. The allocation of resources for public/private partnerships is analogous 
to allocating resources for emergency and crisis management. The real benefits of any 
such investments may not be recognized or appreciated until an actual crisis arises.  
 
                                                 
50 Nassau County is policed by one county police agency, and 21 smaller city and village police 
departments.  
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C. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Law enforcement agencies do not have the capacity to provide real security at the 
infinite number of potential terrorist targets. The vast majority of these potential targets 
are owned and protected by private sector entities. In order to increase the flow of 
information to the law enforcement intelligence network, and build a cooperative local 
homeland security effort, law enforcement agencies must include private sector security 
companies in their local communications network. 
• Law enforcement agencies should institute regular electronic 
communications with private sector security providers to improve the 
local effort to fight terrorism and enhance homeland security. The system 
utilized to communicate with public sector agencies can be used to send 
information to private sector partners.  
• All private agency partners should designate a member of their workforce 
to act as the network point-of-contact. This contact person should monitor 
all the interactions associated with their network participation, and have a 
line of communication to their agency's Chief Officer in order to ensure 
that important information is transmitted, and necessary actions are taken. 
• In addition to the electronic communication, each law enforcement agency 
should conduct regularly scheduled working group meetings to build 
mutual understanding of each private partner agency's informational needs 
and their ability to contribute to the homeland security effort.  
• Law enforcement agencies should create an additional “Sensitive but 
Secure” version of the intelligence product. This version should contain 
the information needed for private sector partners to recognize pre-
operational activity, and enhance security at sensitive sites. 
• All sharing of information between law enforcement and private agencies 
should be limited to that which is allowed by law, and should not violate 
civil rights, or the public trust.   
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The effort to reduce the threat and impact of terrorism in the United States 
requires the creation of a collaborative broad-based network response. Law enforcement 
agencies are in a position to adapt the current intelligence network to provide a platform 
for this collaboration. The realities of budgeting and finite resources require the 
identification of strategies that are effective, but scalable so they can be employed 
regardless of the size of the agency. 
Every law enforcement agency, even smaller agencies that lack a staff dedicated 
to providing intelligence analysis, can still perform all the functions of the intelligence 
process. The National Incident Management System has been adopted as the national 
model for critical incident management. Since NIMS protocol dictates that the incident 
command structure must include the ability to gather, share and manage incident-related 
intelligence, the existing law enforcement intelligence architecture should be used to 
provide this function.  
• Law enforcement administrators should develop a better understanding of 
the mechanics of the intelligence process within their agency and 
recognize the benefits of using intelligence in developing short and long 
term crime reduction strategies, homeland security planning, and incident 
management requirements. 
In order to fully participate in a national effort against terrorism each law 
enforcement agency needs a direct line of communication with a comprehensive national 
source of terrorist intelligence. The National Counter-Terrorism Center is the primary 
organization within the U.S. Government for the analysis and integration of foreign and 
domestic intelligence related to terrorism. Law enforcement agencies receive unclassified 
intelligence developed at the National Counter-Terrorism Center through intermediary 
agencies such as the FBI and DHS.  
• Local agencies should press for legislation that empowers the NCTC to 
create a single direct path for the flow of actionable and relevant 
intelligence to State and local law enforcement agencies.  
• Local agencies should also ask for legislation that creates a State and 
Local Intelligence Council under the Director of National Intelligence for 
the purpose of improving national intelligence to support State, local, and 
tribal efforts.   
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In an effort to facilitate the flow of intelligence, the FBI has instituted a program 
to provide Secret security clearances to decision makers in local law enforcement 
agencies.   
• Local agencies should designate members to apply for the Secret 
classification and thereby access information that could be used to 
enhance local security plans and direct enforcement efforts.  
Since there is no single-source national intelligence link, the law enforcement 
intelligence network participants are required to access information and intelligence using 
data sources such as RISS, ATIX, LEO, and JRIES. These electronic sources provide the 
ability to push local and proprietary data and intelligence up to the regional and national 
level enabling the recognition of patterns and trends that exist beyond the local level.  
• Local agencies must push Federal officials to develop a primary electronic 
intelligence network that can link the Federal, State and local law 
enforcement partners. A single intelligence link with help to eliminate the 
gaps that exist between the NCTC and local agencies. 
• Local agencies must push Federal officials to provide a national 
intelligence education system that allows law enforcement intelligence 
analysts to understand basic standards and adopt best practices.  
The co-location of multi-agency intelligence resources in a Fusion Center enables 
analysts to call upon the information and collection abilities of all participating agencies 
and then integrate that data to produce a more complete intelligence product. Although 
many agencies lack the resources to assign resources to a Fusion Center, the participating 
Federal and State agencies usually disseminate the resulting intelligence products to all 
local agencies.  
• Local law enforcement agencies must appeal to State officials to ensure 
that fusion centers are structured to support both national intelligence and 
local intelligence led policing needs. 
 
A. INTELLIGENCE-LED POLICING TECHNIQUES 
The effort to reduce the threat and impact of terrorism in the United States 
requires the creation of a collaborative broad-based network response and law 
enforcement agencies are in a position to adapt the current intelligence network to 
provide a platform for this collaboration. Adopting intelligence-led policing techniques 
will expand a law enforcement agency's ability to reduce crime and improve quality of 
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life issues within their jurisdiction, and will help to identify terrorist activity, and to 
provide homeland security. The patrol force and other law enforcement members who 
interact with the public should become a conduit for transmitting threat and security 
information to their individual communities. Patrol officers are in the best position to 
recognize locations that could be vulnerable to a terror attack or exploited by terrorist 
conducting pre-operational activities. Increasing interactions related to homeland security 
issues will increase the possibility that suspicious actions or conditions will be reported.   
• Agencies should redouble efforts toward understanding the cultures, 
beliefs and traditions of the racial, religious and ethnic groups represented 
in the communities they serve. Special attention should be given to 
building rapport, establishing mutual trust and creating a commonality of 
purpose.  
• Agency administrators must insure that intelligence is not hoarded by 
intelligence analysts or a few select investigators. The national goal of 
enhancing homeland security will benefit from increasing the ability of all 
law enforcement personnel to access intelligence.  
 
1. Public Sector Agencies 
Combining the resources of local law enforcement agencies with the resources of 
the public sector is an important step in developing a network response to homeland 
security issues and the protection of vital infrastructure. The system of exchanging 
information / intelligence between partner agencies could be incorporated as part of an 
agencies intelligence-led policing strategy. Even smaller law enforcement agencies with 
limited resources can become a communications conduit between local public agencies 
and a State or regional law enforcement intelligence system.  
• Law enforcement agencies should institute regular electronic 
communications with public agencies to create a coordinated and 
cooperative local effort to fight terrorism and enhance homeland security.  
Expanding the law enforcement network to include other public sector agencies is 
a “force multiplier” in local anti-terrorism efforts. Public agencies can participate by 
working together in response and recovery planning, and by educating their workforce so 
that they can recognize and report potential terror activity. Law enforcement agencies 
should create two forms of the intelligence product. One version should be “law 
enforcement sensitive” and contain the information needed for law enforcement 
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purposes. The other version should be “Public Sector Sensitive” and contain information 
that would be useful to public agencies.  In addition to the electronic communication, 
each law enforcement agency should conduct regularly scheduled working group 
meetings to build mutual understanding of each partner agency's strengths, limitations 
and their ability to contribute to the effort. The working group meetings should also be 
used to coordinate preparedness issues and planning. 
Managing the expanded network requires strict monitoring to ensure that essential 
liberties are not violated in the effort to provide security. This public network must 
operate with a degree of transparency so that advocacy groups and the media can 
understand the goals of the program and help the agencies to ensure that they are meeting 
the public’s expectations. All sharing of information between law enforcement and other 
public agencies should be limited to that which is allowed by law, and should not violate 
civil rights, or the public trust.   
All public partner agencies should be encouraged to designate a member of their 
workforce to act as the network point-of-contact. This contact person should monitor all 
the interactions associated with their network participation, and have a line of 
communication to their agency's Chief Officer in order to ensure that the exchange of 
information does not negatively affect their agency's mission. 
Once this public sector communications network is developed law enforcement 
agencies should conduct regular reviews of intelligence cases to determine if the goals of 
the expanded network are being attained and essential liberties are being protected. All 
information that will be released from the Intelligence Unit to the public agency partners 
should also be rechecked to ensure that it will not endanger any active investigations or 
sources.  
 
2. Private Sector Agencies 
Law enforcement agencies do not have the capacity to provide real security at the 
vast number of potential terrorist targets. The large majority of these potential targets are 
owned and protected by private sector entities. In order to increase the flow of 
information to the law enforcement intelligence network, and build a cooperative local 
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homeland security effort, law enforcement agencies must include private sector security 
companies in their local communications network. 
• Law enforcement agencies should institute regular electronic 
communications with private sector security providers to improve the 
local effort to fight terrorism and enhance homeland security. The same 
system utilized to communicate with public sector agencies can be used to 
send information to private sector partners.  
All private agency partners should designate a member of their workforce to act 
as the network point-of-contact. This contact person should monitor all the interactions 
associated with their network participation, and have a line of communication to their 
agency's Chief Officer in order to ensure that important information is transmitted, and 
necessary actions are taken. 
In addition to the electronic communication, each law enforcement agency should 
conduct regularly scheduled working group meetings to build mutual understanding of 
each private partner agency's informational needs and their ability to contribute to the 
homeland security effort.  
Law enforcement agencies should create an additional “Sensitive but Secure” 
version of the intelligence product. This version should contain the information needed 
for private sector partners to recognize pre-operational activity, and enhance security at 
sensitive sites. 
All sharing of information between law enforcement and private agencies should 
be limited to that which is allowed by law, and should not violate civil rights, or the 
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